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Abstract This study examined five aspects of change (or
stability) in cognitive abilities in middle adulthood across a
12-year period. Data come from the Interdisciplinary Study
on Adult Development. The sample consisted of N = 346
adults (43.8 years on average, 48.6% female). In total, 11
cognitive tests were administered to assess fluid and crys-
tallized intelligence, memory, and processing speed. In a
first series of analyses, strong measurement invariance was
established. Subsequently, structural stability, differential
stability, stability of divergence, absolute stability, and the
generality of changes were examined. Factor covariances
were shown to be equal across time, implying structural
stability. Stability coefficients were around .90 for fluid and
crystallized intelligence, and speed, indicating high, yet not
perfect differential stability. The coefficient for memory
was .58. Only in processing speed the variance increased
across time, indicating heterogeneity in interindividual
development. Significant mean-level changes emerged,
with an increase in crystallized intelligence and decline in
the other three abilities. A number of correlations among
changes in cognitive abilities were significant, implying
that cognitive changes in middle adulthood share up to 50
percent of variance.
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Does cognitive performance change during middle adult-
hood? For many, middle adulthood represents a phase of
stability, during which hardly any developmental changes
are observed. Although some authors (e.g., Schaie 1994;
Hertzog and Schaie 1986, 1988) have addressed cognitive
development in middle-aged persons, altogether, there are
only few studies concerning the topic in this age group.
Thus, the question of whether or not cognition changes
between the 40s and 60s still comes, at least in part, in form
of a secret. This is also the case because there are different
perspectives on cognitive change (e.g., Schaie 1974; Hess
2005). In the present study, we aim to shed some light on
this secret by examining 12-year changes of cognition in a
sample of middle-aged adults.
Although developmental and cognitive aging researchers
tend to think of single individuals and the way their cogni-
tive performance changes across time, what they usually
examine are the data of groups or samples of persons.
In such sample data, several statistical parameters can be
used to describe the distribution of cognitive performance
differences and their associations across time. Typical
parameters are means, variances, and covariances, all of
which may be subject to change over time. The question of
whether cognition changes in middle adulthood or whether
it remains stable can, thus, be answered in several ways,
depending on what type of change (or stability) one focuses
on. As we will demonstrate in this paper, there are (at least)
five types of change (or stability) that can be examined using
longitudinal sample data. Thus, there are ‘‘five views of a
secret,’’ namely, of whether cognition changes during
middle adulthood.
Interestingly, the parameter least informative with
respect to the change of single individuals is the one most
often studied, namely, the mean. From the fact that the mean
of sample data does not change, one could conclude that no
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single individual changes if in addition, it is assumed that the
mean is representative for all individuals or, which is the
same, that there are no interindividual differences in intra-
individual change—an assumption which can hardly ever be
true. In the following, we expand the perspective of mean
changes (or absolute change) by four other types of change
(or stability), namely, structural change, differential change,
change in divergence, and general versus specific change
(Allemand et al. 2007).
Structural change (or stability) refers to the constancy of
covariances among a set of variables across time or in dif-
ferent age groups. In other words, structural change
addresses the issue of changing associations among psy-
chological constructs over time. In cognitive aging research,
the question mainly addressed in investigating structural
stability refers to differentiation or dedifferentiation, that is,
a change in structure. Empirically, structural stability is
assessed by comparing the covariation pattern among vari-
ables. In order to exclude changes or differences in covari-
ances due to measurement error, factor analysis techniques
are commonly used, and structural stability is then examined
on the latent level. However, this requires that constructs are
measured in the same way on different measurement occa-
sions or in different age groups. In order to guarantee this,
several degrees of measurement invariance (MI) can be
examined (see Meredith 1993). Configural invariance
entails that the number of factors and according salient and
non-salient loadings are equal across age groups or over
time, which ensures that the dimensionality of the measured
construct is equivalent. For weak MI to hold, factor loadings
must be equal. If so, factor variances and covariances can be
compared. If in addition, the intercepts of the manifest
indicators are equal, strong MI is given, which allows
comparing factor means. Eventually, if residual variances
are also equal, strict MI holds, implying that all interindi-
vidual differences in observed variables stem from the
underlying factors (cf. Bollen 1989; Meredith and Horn
2001).
Empirical research on structural stability in middle
adulthood is sparse at present. A special case of structural
change is the question of differentiation or dedifferentiation
of cognitive abilities with advancing age (e.g., Ghisletta and
Lindenberger 2003; Zelinsky and Lewis 2003). Differenti-
ation denotes a decrease of covariances across time or in
older age groups, while dedifferentiation refers to an
increase of covariances. Some cross-sectional studies have
provided empirical support for cognitive dedifferentiation in
older adults (Babcock et al. 1997; Baltes et al. 1980; Hertzog
and Bleckley 2001). In other cross-sectional studies, con-
trary findings, i.e., a differentiation of cognitive abilities
with age, have been reported (Cunningham et al. 1975;
Schmidt and Botwinick 1989; Tomer and Cunningham
1993, Tucker-Drob and Salthouse 2008), or results
supported neither differentiation nor dedifferentiation
(Bickley et al. 1995; Cunningham and Birren 1980; Juan-
Espinosa et al. 2000, 2002; Park et al. 2002; Sims et al.
2009). Thus, the question of dedifferentiation appears to
represent an unresolved issue in cross-sectional data. To our
knowledge, only few longitudinal studies examined cogni-
tive dedifferentiation in old age. Anstey et al. (2003) did not
find consistent patterns of dedifferentiation. In contrast, in a
sample of 377 individuals aged 79 years and older, Ghisletta
and de Ribaupierre (2005) did find corroborative results for
dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities in late life (see also de
Frias et al. 2007). Hence, longitudinal research on cognitive
dedifferentiation is also inconclusive. Notably, structural
stability has hardly ever been investigated in samples of
middle-aged individuals. In what follows, we aim at
examining this issue longitudinally.
Differential change (or stability) refers to the retention
of an individual’s relative placement within a group across
time. Consistency of interindividual differences may only
be assessed longitudinally because it requires at least two
measurement occasions. Conceptually, differential change
implies that some individuals change to a larger (or smal-
ler) amount than others across time. It describes how
change in a specific variable affects the rank order of
individuals. Different people may change to a different
degree across time. These differences cannot be depicted in
mean-level analyses. Hence, even with perfect mean-level
stability or stability of divergence (see below), the rank
order of the individuals may change across time. Tradi-
tionally, correlations across time have been computed for
manifest variables of cognitive abilities. Although random
errors should cancel out across repeated assessments, there
might be other systematic influences, e.g., method effects
or unreliability, which may qualify the comparison of
observed scores across time. Again, a possible strategy to
diminish such unwanted influences might be to examine
differential change (or stability) on the latent level (cf.
Martin and Zimprich 2005).
One problem with differential change is that no man-
datory guidelines exist as when to say stability is low
enough for being indicative of substantial change. Thus, it
remains an open question whether correlations of .90 might
be interpreted as stability with only negligible change or as
change because of the deviation from perfect stability (i.e.,
1.0). In our investigation, we thus tested whether differ-
ential stabilities were significantly smaller than one. To our
knowledge, differential change (or stability) in middle
adulthood has only rarely been examined to date. Hertzog
and Schaie (1986, 1988) examined general intelligence
over a 14-year period with measurement intervals of
7 years in three age groups (young: 25–32, middle: 39–46,
old: 53–67 years of age at first measurement). In all three
age groups, factor correlations of general intelligence were
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as high as r = .95 between times 1 and 2 and r = .92
between times 1 and 3, thus indicating stable, yet not
perfect, interindividual differences. Similarly, Larsen et al.
(2008) found differential stabilities of r = .82 and r = .79,
in verbal and arithmetic subtests, respectively, in a sample
of middle-aged adults across 18 years. Our expectation
thus was to find relatively strong, albeit not perfect, dif-
ferential stability in middle adulthood across 12 years.
Change (or stability) of divergence refers to the fact that
the amount of interindividual differences in a cognitive
ability might change over time or be different in different
age groups. Do individuals become more or less similar
over time? This implies that across time the variances of
cognitive measures may decrease or increase (Preece 1982).
Change in variances implies interindividual differences in
the amount of change. Conceptually, increasing variances
indicate increasing heterogeneity; decreasing variances, in
turn, indicate growing homogeneity with respect to inter-
individual differences in cognitive abilities. Change of
divergence conceptually refers to the so-called ‘‘fanspread-
phenomenon,’’ which means that the pattern of trajectories
resembles a converging or diverging fan-spread (Preece
1982). To date, there are only few results dealing with
change or stability of divergence of cognitive abilities in
middle age. Martin and Zimprich (2005) showed that the
variance in processing speed significantly changed across a
4-year period in middle-aged adults, whereas the variance
in memory did not. From that one might conclude that—
irrespective of differential stability or change—there are
interindividual differences in the amount of change in
processing speed. For the present investigation, we thus
expected change of divergence at least in processing speed,
but maybe also in other cognitive abilities taking into
account the longitudinal time span of 12 years.
Absolute change (or stability) refers to change in the
mean of a cognitive ability over time or across age groups.
Conceptually, absolute change reflects the amount of aver-
age change that is present in a psychological construct or
cognitive ability. With absolute change one can describe
trends within a given sample or population but cannot
describe how a given variable changes for a single indi-
vidual. Traditionally, sample means of cognitive abilities
have been compared in order to test for absolute change
(e.g., Schaie 1996). Using latent growth models, Finkel et al.
(2003) found that, across a 6-year period, the longitudinal
rate of decline in a sample of 590 adults aged 44–88 years
accelerated from middle to later adulthood for some cog-
nitive abilities. A single-slope estimate provided sufficient
description of the data for half of the cognitive measures,
meaning that the rate of decline in these abilities did not
differ by age groups. Thus, accelerating decline at the
transition from middle to late adulthood seems to be evident
for some, but not all, cognitive abilities. Similarly, Finkel
et al. (1998) reported that middle-aged adults (55 years)
performed significantly better than old adults (83 years) in
all tests of a battery of 14 cognitive abilities. The largest age
differences in mean performance were found for measures
of perceptual speed. Soederberg Miller and Lachman (2000)
investigated whether midlife is a time of peak performance
in the area of cognitive functioning. Comparing the average
performance of 84 young adults (25–39 years), 108 middle-
aged adults (40–59 years), and 67 older adults (60–75 years)
in speed, reasoning, short-term memory, and vocabulary,
they found that middle-aged adults showed little or no
cognitive decline in cognitive performance and even out-
performed the young on vocabulary. Relative to older
adults, middle-aged adults scored higher on all tasks except
for vocabulary, where no differences emerged. Larsen et al.
(2008) reported a significant increase in verbal score but no
change in arithmetic scores across 18 years in a sample of
more than 4,000 males for two measurement occasions (ages
19 and 38). This underlines the possible gain in vocabulary
in middle adulthood.
Like with the other types of change, there are advantages
in assessing absolute change (or stability) on the latent level
by comparing factor means across time or age groups. Horn
and McArdle (1992), for example, after having established
strong MI, found that compared to young (16–22 years) and
old (67–72 years) adults the average verbal cognitive
component in the WAIS-R was highest in both middle-aged
adults groups (30–40, 50–60 years), whereas the average
performance cognitive component was highest in the
younger age group and the younger of the two middle-aged-
cohorts. Specifically, the effect size for the verbal cognitive
component was about Cohen’s d = .40, indicating a small
to medium performance difference favoring middle-aged
adults (cf. Cohen 1987). Taken together, in our sample of
middle-aged adults followed for 12 years, we thus expected
a longitudinal performance increase in measures of crys-
tallized intelligence, but a longitudinal decline in fluid
intelligence, memory, and processing speed.
Specific versus general change (or stability) refers to the
question of whether different cognitive abilities change
together over time, that is, whether changes are correlated
across different cognitive abilities. If so, cognitive change
would be relatively general. Conceptually, general change
describes if one mechanism operates simultaneously on
different cognitive domains. If this is the case, then intra-
individual changes should be rather general across different
cognitive aspects. Empirically, specific versus general sta-
bility can be assessed by correlating interindividual differ-
ences in intraindividual change in different cognitive
abilities. General change should lead to substantial corre-
lations among the different cognitive factors. In order to
assess change precisely, latent change models are com-
monly used. The level of the latent construct and the change
Eur J Ageing (2010) 7:135–146 137
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of this construct are then estimated. These models enable to
test whether change in one variable predicts change in
another variable (Hertzog and Nesselroade 2003). Hultsch
et al. (1998), using data from the Victoria Longitudinal
Study, specified a common factor model of cognitive change
for a number of measures of intellectual abilities. They
found that there was some commonality of changes across
different cognitive abilities. Zimprich (2002) modeled a
common change factor of cognitive abilities using data from
the Bonn Longitudinal Study on Aging and the older cohort
from the Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on Adult
Development. Findings indicated some shared variance
among cognitive changes. More recently, Christensen et al.
(2004) fitted a common factor of change in cognitive abil-
ities to data from the Canberra Longitudinal Study. Zim-
prich and Martin (2009), using a multilevel factor analysis
approach, reported that in old adults on the level of factors
longitudinal changes were as strongly correlated as cross-
sectional age differences. Note that these studies have
focused on old age, where more pronounced changes are to
be expected than in middle adulthood. Thus, we expected to
see some correlated change in middle-aged adults, but that,
similar to older persons, correlations would be weaker
compared to cross-sectional correlations.
In order to summarize, in this study, we concentrate on
five different aspects of change (or stability) of cognitive
abilities in middle adulthood. Structural change, differen-
tial change, absolute change, change of divergence, and
specific versus general change in 11 cognitive tasks rep-
resenting four cognitive abilities are examined in a middle-
aged group across a 12-year period. Although the cited
empirical evidence mainly relies on older adults, leaning
on these results we expected to find both stability and
change of cognitive abilities in middle adulthood.
Method
Sample
Data come from the Interdisciplinary Study on Adult
Development (ILSE, Martin et al. 2000) an ongoing
interdisciplinary longitudinal study on the psychological,
physical, and social antecedents and consequences of aging
in Germany. This study included persons who belong to the
younger of the two cohorts in ILSE and who had complete
data records for the variables of interest at the first and the
third measurement occasions in 1994 and 2006, resulting in
a sample size of N = 346. On average, participants were
43.8 years old at T1 in 1994 (SD 0.9 years). About 48.6%
of the sample were female. The reason for discarding the
data from the second measurement occasion in 1998 was
that only a reduced battery of cognitive tests was
administered in the younger cohort. Compared to those 203
subjects who dropped out before T3 (of whom 57 left the
study before T2), those who stayed in the study showed a
higher performance at T1 in almost all cognitive tasks.
Effect sizes were small, however, ranging from 3% of
explained variance in the picture completion test to 0% in
the delayed Picture Recall test (for a description of tests,
see below). On average, the effect size was 1.7%. Hence,
although the sample appears to have become slightly more
selective between T1 and T3, one might still consider it as
reasonably representative.
Measures
Processing speed
Speed was assessed using two different instruments: the
number-connecting test designed for older adults and the
digit symbol substitution test.
Number connecting The number-connecting test (Oswald
and Roth 1987) is a timed paper–pencil test requiring
participants to connect successive numbers. Participants
had to finish five working sheets, the first three of which
served as practice trials. The dependent variables were the
times (in seconds) to complete the last two sheets. The
results from the number-connecting test were reversed so
that high values indicate better performance. Since the
results of the number-connecting test departed significantly
from normality, they were Box–Cox-transformed (cf. Box
and Cox 1964) using k = -0.8 for both trials at both
measurement occasions.
Digit symbol substitution This task was taken from the
German version of the WAIS-R (Tewes 1991). The par-
ticipant is requested to match symbols with digits accord-
ing to a given coding table. The dependent variable is the
number of correctly copied symbols on a working sheet
within 90 s (possible range 0–67 points).
Fluid intelligence
Fluid intelligence was assessed using three different man-
ifest indicators, namely, Spatial ability, block design, and
picture completion.
Spatial ability This task required participants to count the
number of surfaces (including hidden ones) in 40 different
three-dimensional images of geometrical figures taken
from the LPS (Horn 1983). In total, participants were given
3 min to work on the task. Every correct answer was scored
with one point. Correct responses were summed in order to
form a total score of spatial ability (possible range: 0–40).
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Block design This task, which was taken from the Ger-
man version of the WAIS-R (Tewes 1991), required par-
ticipants to reproduce abstract patterns using nine colored
blocks. The nine item scores were added to form a total
score of block design (possible range: 0–51).
Picture completion This task, which stemmed from the
German WAIS-R (Tewes 1991), required participants to
mention details that were missing on pictures of simple
objects (e.g., a car with a missing wheel). In total, there
were 17 pictures. Every correct response was scored with
one point. Correct responses were added to form a total
score of picture completion (possible range: 0–17).
Crystallized intelligence
Crystallized intelligence was measured using three different
manifest indicators, namely, picture completion (see above),
information, and similarities. As McArdle and Prescott
(1992) have shown, picture completion can be conceptual-
ized as being a marker of both fluid intelligence—partici-
pants have to reason which logically necessary part of an
object is missing—and crystallized intelligence, because in
order to recognize objects as familiar or common objects,
knowledge is required (cf. Horn 1985).
Information This task, which was taken from the German
WAIS-R (Tewes 1991), required participants to answer a
total of 24 questions from different knowledge domains
(e.g., what is an ode?). Every correct response was scored
with one point. All correct responses were summed up to
form a total score of information (possible range: 0–24).
Similarities For this task, which stemmed from the Ger-
man WAIS-R (Tewes 1991), participants were asked to
name what two concepts had in common (e.g., zoo—
library). In total, there were 16 pairs of concepts.
Depending on the quality of the response, correct solutions
were scored with one or two points. Correct answers were
added to form a total score of similarities (possible range:
0–32).
Memory
Memory was measured using a picture recall task, a
delayed picture recall task, and a word recall task from a
German gerontological test battery (Nuremberg Inventory
of Old Age; Oswald and Fleischmann 1995).
Picture recall immediate For this task, seven pictures of
objects were presented to the participants for 3 s each.
After the presentation of all pictures, participants were
immediately asked to recall as many objects as possible.
Scored was the number of correctly recalled objects (pos-
sible range: 0–7 points).
Picture recall delayed The delayed picture recall task
demanded recall of the same seven objects after a 30 min
interval. Scored was the number of correctly recalled
objects (possible range: 0–7 points).
Word list recall For the word list recall task, 12 words
were read aloud to the participants in intervals of 2 s.
Immediately after presentation, participants were asked to
repeat as many of the words as they could remember. The
number of correctly recalled words was scored (possible
range: 0–12 points).
Statistical modeling
In order to investigate our research questions we utilized
multiple-groups confirmatory factor analyses by means of
structural equation modeling. We assessed MI over time and
then performed direct statistical comparisons of the simi-
larities and differences in the factor means, variances, and
covariances among the constructs. In order to model the
different types of change on the latent level, we started by
investigating the amount of MI. After having established
strong MI, we tested for structural stability by constraining
the covariances among latent variables (processing speed,
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory) to
be equal at T1 and T2. Next, differential stability was
examined by constraining across-time correlations of the
latent variables between T1 and T2 to be equal to one.
Subsequently, stability of divergence was investigated by
constraining variances of the latent variables to be equal at
T1 and T2. Next, absolute stability was examined by con-
straining the factor means of each latent variable to be equal
at T1 and T2. Note that in these model comparisons, the
amount of misfit was tested for statistical significance by
calculating v2-difference test. Eventually, the generality of
12-year intraindividual changes in cognition was investi-
gated by correlating the changes between T1 and T2 among
the latent variables. Models were parameterized as descri-
bed in more detail in Allemand et al. (2007) and Zimprich
et al. (2006). Specifically, as recommended by Meredith and
Horn (2001), factors were scaled in a way that all factor
loadings were estimated instead of using a marker variable.
In order to keep factors identified, factor means were set to
zero and factors variances were constrained to be one.
Depending on the model tested, these constraints were
relaxed gradually (see the ‘‘Results’’ section).
All analyses were conducted using Mx (Neale et al.
2003). The absolute goodness-of-fit of models was evalu-
ated using the v2-test and two additional criteria, the
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square
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Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Values of the CFI
above .90 are considered to be adequate, whereas for the
RMSEA values less than .08 indicate an acceptable model
fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993). In comparing the relative fit
of nested models, we used the v2-difference test. We
complemented the v2-difference by calculating 90%
RMSEA confidence intervals for the models estimated
(MacCallum et al. 1996).
Results
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
of the 22 manifest indicator variables. As can be seen from
Table 1, the stabilities especially for the indicators of
memory were low, i.e., smaller than .71, which implies that
the T1 and T3 measures shared less than 50% of variance.
Also, the standard deviations of most manifest variables
tend to increase over time, whereas means tend to
decrease—apart from information, where average perfor-
mance increased.
Measurement invariance
Structural equation modeling started with the configural
invariance model of four correlated factors fluid intelli-
gence, crystallized intelligence, memory, and processing
speed, where at both measurement occasions each manifest
variable served as an indicator of the factor it was desig-
nated to measure. In addition, the residuals of the manifest
variables were allowed to covary over time to reflect the
assumption that specific parts of these measures might be
associated across time.1 As can be seen from Table 2, the
configural invariance model achieved an acceptable fit
according to both the CFI and the RMSEA, although the
chi-square-test indicated significant departures of the
model from the data—which is also owed to the high
power of this test in conjunction with many degrees of
freedom. As a consequence, we considered the configural
invariance model as adequately describing the data.
Subsequently, weak measurement across time was
imposed by requiring the factor loadings to be equal at both
T1 and T3 (Model Weak MI). As Table 2 shows, doing so
did not significantly reduce model fit, implying that weak
measurement holds. Thus, at both measurement occasions
the scaling of the latent variables was equal, which allows
variance and covariance comparisons of the factors across
time. For all four factors, variances at T3 were somewhat
larger than at T1, indicating that interindividual differences
tended to increase from 1994 to 2006. A more stringent test
of factor variance differences was conducted in conjunc-
tion with the investigation of stability of divergence (see
below).
In the next model (Model Strong MI), intercepts of the
manifest indicators were constrained to be equal across
time, thus imposing strong MI. According to Table 2, the
fit of this model was not statistically inferior to that of the
previous one, from which one might conclude that strong
MI holds across T1 and T3. Consequently, factor mean
differences can be calculated across time, because all mean
differences of the manifest indicators are due to differences
in latent variable means in the strong invariance model. It
turned out that for the factor of crystallized intelligence
performance did, on average, increase across time, while
for the other three factors fluid intelligence, memory, and
processing speed there was a performance decline during
the 12 years of middle adulthood. Factor mean differences
were examined in more detail relating to absolute stability
(see below).
Finally, strict MI was imposed by requiring residual
variances of the 11 manifest indicator variables to be equal
at T1 and T3 (Model Strict MI). As Table 2 shows, model fit
decreased significantly compared to the previous model.
Hence, it appeared as if at least some of the residual vari-
ances were different at the two measurement occasions.
However, according to both the CFI and, especially, the
RMSEA, these differences did not seem to be very pro-
nounced. Notwithstanding, we concluded that strict mea-
surement did not hold, which implied that not all differences
in the variances of the manifest indicator variables were due
to differences in factor variances. Note that for examining
the five different types of change, as reported below, strict
MI does not represent a prerequisite. It is sufficient to
establish strong MI, which, according to Model Strong MI,
held in the ILSE data.
Structural stability
In order to test for structural stability, i.e., the equality of
covariation patterns of the latent variables at T1 and T3,
factor covariances were constrained to be equal at both
measurement occasions (Model Structural Stability). As
can be seen from Table 2, doing so did not lead to a sta-
tistically significant decrement in model fit compared to the
strong MI model. Hence, one might conclude that covari-
ances among fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence,
memory, and processing speed were equal in 1994 and
1 An anonymous reviewer noted that correlated residuals were not
common practice. However, in conjunction with longitudinal data, the
assumption of correlated residuals appears reasonable according to the
factor-analytic model, where an observed score in a manifest variable
is composed of a common factor score (e.g., fluid intelligence), a
specific factor score, and measurement error (cf. Meredith and Horn,
2001). The specific factor might, for example, contain effects specific
to the stimulus material or specific to the task. These specific parts may
be associated over time.
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2006. Note that the structural stability model represents an
overall, simultaneous test of the equality of all six factor
covariances at T1 and T3. Individual covariances did show
differences over time, notably the covariance between
memory and processing speed, which increased consider-
ably across time (T1: 0.343, T3: 0.657).2 A model where
the equality constraint of the memory—speed covariance
was relaxed, achieved a significantly better fit than the
Model Structural Stability (v2 = 341.6, df = 190, Dv2 =
9.3, df = 1, p \ .01). Thus, it appears as if the covariance
between memory and processing speed is larger at T3 than
at T1. One could consider this as being indicative of
dedifferentiation between memory and speed—albeit one
should be cautious in interpreting this possibly spurious
result, because the overall test did not show a significant
difference.
Differential stability
In order to assess differential stability, the across-time
factor correlations were estimated as based on Model
Strong MI. Factor stabilities were .94 (fluid intelligence),
.93 (crystallized intelligence), .58 (memory), and .91
(processing speed). Thus, with the exception of memory,
differential stabilities were relatively high, although not
perfect. This implies that the rank order of persons did not
change very much in fluid intelligence, crystallized intel-
ligence, and processing speed. By contrast, it appears as if
memory performance was less stable with regard to inter-
individual differences across time. In an attempt to more
rigorously test whether differential stabilities were perfect,
i.e., equal to one, in the Model Differential Stability 1
(Table 2) across-time correlations of the factors were
constrained to one. As Table 2 shows, the model of perfect
stability represented a significant loss in fit compared to the
strong invariance model, at least implying that not all of the
differential stabilities were perfect. If only the stabilities of
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing
speed were constrained to be equal (Model Differential
Stability 2), model fit increased again (see Table 2), but
still was significantly inferior to that of the model of strong
invariance. Hence, we concluded that differential stabilities
were less than perfect, i.e., different from one. From this
one might also conclude that there was differential devel-
opment in cognition between 1994 and 2006, mostly so in
memory.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations of the manifest variables
Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
1. Information T1 16.5 4.00
2. Similarities T1 26.3 4.69 .59
3. Picture completion T1 13.2 2.77 .49 .45
4. Spatial ability T1 25.0 6.45 .49 .43 .50
5. Block design T1 31.7 8.46 .41 .40 .39 .55
6. Number connecting 1 T1 12.4 2.59 .24 .23 .23 .37 .40
7. Number connecting 2 T1 13.0 2.31 .25 .25 .25 .37 .43 .71
8. Digit symbol subst. T1 54.3 9.44 .27 .33 .25 .31 .35 .49 .51
9. Word list recall T1 6.41 1.50 .21 .31 .22 .17 .08 .11 .15 .24
10. Picture recall imm. T1 5.87 0.90 .09 .19 .14 .09 .09 .15 .09 .24 .30
11. Picture recall delayed T1 4.66 1.14 .05 .16 .10 .05 .11 .17 .10 .20 .24 .48
12. Information T3 17.5 4.06 .84 .52 .43 .46 .32 .21 .20 .22 .18 .04 .03
13. Similarities T3 26.3 4.57 .57 .69 .31 .35 .35 .28 .27 .34 .23 .16 .05 .57
14. Picture completion T3 13.4 2.88 .47 .34 .46 .37 .35 .30 .27 .26 .16 .14 .08 .49 .41
15. Spatial ability T3 24.9 6.30 .51 .42 .43 .80 .55 .37 .37 .28 .16 .12 .13 .49 .39 .42
16. Block design T3 30.0 8.76 .39 .35 .37 .56 .78 .38 .41 .36 .10 .10 .07 .37 .37 .40 .58
17. Number connecting 1 T3 11.8 2.73 .22 .23 .23 .29 .36 .61 .51 .52 .15 .19 .20 .20 .26 .21 .35 .38
18. Number connecting 2 T3 12.3 2.51 .21 .29 .23 .36 .37 .61 .60 .52 .18 .20 .18 .19 .27 .26 .38 .41 .76
19. Digit symbol subst. T3 52.1 10.4 .25 .31 .19 .28 .35 .49 .48 .81 .21 .21 .21 .22 .35 .23 .30 .37 .61 .61
20. Word list recall T3 6.51 1.43 .26 .27 .18 .18 .14 .23 .20 .30 .24 .25 .20 .25 .32 .28 .23 .16 .33 .31 .40
21. Picture recall imm. T3 5.73 0.90 .05 .19 .12 .04 .16 .19 .15 .21 .19 .24 .30 .04 .14 .15 .10 .14 .26 .26 .27 .24
22. Picture recall delayed T3 4.24 1.40 -.02 .05 .08 .03 .06 .18 .14 .17 .14 .23 .47 -.01 .05 .16 .09 .11 .23 .20 .27 .27 .52
Note: SD standard deviation, T1 first measurement occasion (1994), Subst. substitution, Imm. immediate, T3 third measurement occasion (2006). N = 346
2 In a correlational metric, the difference is smaller, namely, r = .34
versus r = .46. Still, this implies that the amount of shared variance
between memory and processing speed increased from 12 to 21%.
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Stability of divergence
In a first model (Model Stability of Divergence 1), factor
variances of fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence,
memory, and processing speed were constrained to be
equal over time, thus imposing equally pronounced inter-
individual differences at T1 and T3. As Table 2 shows,
such a model did not achieve an adequate fit compared to
the strong MI model. Hence, at least one factor variance
was significantly changing across time. Upon inspection,
the variance of processing speed increased considerably
(T1: 1.00, T3: 1.47). In a subsequent model (Model Sta-
bility of Divergence 2), only the factor variances of fluid
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory were
constrained to be constant over time. According to Table 2,
the fit of this second stability of divergence model did not
differ significantly from that of the strong MI model. From
this, we concluded that the amount of interindividual dif-
ferences increased in processing speed over time, while for
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory it
remained constant across the two measurement occasions.
Absolute stability
As an overall test of factor mean differences between T1
and T3, factor means were constrained to be equal to zero
at both measurement occasions (Model Absolute Stability).
Table 2 reveals that such a model did not achieve an
adequate model fit compared to the strong MI model.
Hence, at least one factor mean difference was different
from zero. When factor means were estimated freely as
based on the model of strong MI, they were -0.145 (fluid
intelligence), 0.296 (crystallized intelligence), -0.362
(memory), and -0.347 (processing speed), all of which
were statistically significant (p \ .01). Since factors are
scaled differently, a direct comparison of factor mean
differences is not warranted. If transformed to effect sizes
(Cohen’s d for repeated measures), factor mean differences
become d = -0.41 (fluid intelligence), d = 0.79 (crystal-
lized intelligence), d = -0.37 (memory), and d = -0.74
(processing speed). Thus, factor mean differences were in
the medium effect size range for fluid intelligence and
memory. By contrast, there were strong effects for both
crystallized intelligence and processing speed, albeit in
different directions, that is, an increase versus a decrease in
performance across 12 years. Figure 1 depicts the factor
mean change effect sizes.
Generality of change (correlated change)
In order to assess the generality of intraindividual changes,
the model of strong MI was re-specified as a latent change
model (Hertzog and Nesselroade 2003). Then, correlations
between T1 performance level and latent changes across
time were estimated, as well as the correlations among the
latent changes of the four cognitive abilities. Table 3 shows
the according values. For reasons of completeness, the
correlations between the factors at T1 are also given. Here,
all correlations were statistically significant, thus reflecting
the typical picture of a positive manifold among cognitive
abilities. Correlations were strongest between fluid intelli-
gence and crystallized intelligence (r = .74) and between
2 In a correlational metric, the difference is smaller, namely, r = .34
versus r = .46. Still, this implies that the amount of shared variance
between memory and processing speed increased from 12 to 21%.
Table 2 Sequence of estimated models
Model v2 df Dv2 Ddf CFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Configural invariance 317.9* 170 0.964 0.050 0.042–0.059
Weak MI 321.7* 178 3.8*a 8 0.965 0.048 0.040–0.057
Strong MI 337.1* 185 15.4*a 7 0.963 0.049 0.040–0.057
Strict MI 366.0* 196 28.9*a 11 0.958 0.050 0.042–0.058
Structural stability 350.9* 191 13.8a* 6a 0.961 0.049 0.041–0.057
Differential stability 1 420.9* 189 83.8*a 4a 0.943 0.060 0.052–0.067
Differential stability 2 373.5* 188 36.4*a 3a 0.955 0.053 0.045–0.061
Stability of divergence 1 360.2* 189 23.1*a 4a 0.958 0.051 0.043–0.059
Stability of divergence 2 339.7* 188 2.6a* 3a 0.963 0.048 0.040–0.056
Absolute stability 474.4* 189 137.3*a 4a 0.930 0.066 0.059–0.074
Note: df degrees of freedom, CFI Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, CI confidence interval, MI
measurement invariance, differential stability 1 model of perfect across-time stability (i.e., differential stability = 1) on the latent level.
Differential stability 2 model of perfect across-time stability for fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing speed. N = 346
* p \ .01
a Represents the difference to Model Strong MI
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fluid intelligence and processing speed (r = .66). In turn,
the weakest correlation emerged between fluid intelligence
and memory (r = .21). Hence, associations among the four
cognitive factors were in the moderate to large range.
With respect to the relations among cognitive abilities at
T1 and the changes in cognitive abilities, four correlations
reached statistical significance. First, the correlations
among fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and
memory with the change in crystallized intelligence were
negative and in the small to moderate range. This implies
that persons high in fluid intelligence, crystallized intelli-
gence, and memory in 1994 showed a slightly lesser
increase in crystallized intelligence across the 12 years. In
turn, persons with a lower level in these three cognitive
abilities at T1 exhibited a somewhat stronger increase in
crystallized intelligence. Note that these negative correla-
tions might also be indicative of a ceiling effect: Those
who already ranked high at T1 had fewer possibilities to
improve their performance. In addition, the correlation
between memory in 1994 and change in memory was
significant and of moderate negative size, implying that
those high in memory at T1 declined more across time than
those low in memory. Again, the measurement range may
play a critical role here, albeit in the sense of an active floor
effect: The decline of those scoring low in memory already
in 1994 was hardly measurable.
Eventually, four correlations among the cognitive change
factors were statistically significant. For changes in fluid
intelligence and changes in crystallized intelligence, a cor-
relation of r = .72 was estimated, implying that those who
declined less in fluid intelligence improved more in crys-
tallized intelligence—and vice versa. One might speculate
that the strong correlation between changes in fluid intelli-
gence and crystallized intelligence may be due to the fact
that both factors share one manifest indicator, namely,
picture completion. However, once picture completion is
allowed to load on fluid intelligence only (or, alternatively,
on crystallized intelligence only), the change correlation
even increases (r = .83). Hence, there was a substantial
amount of coupled change between these two cognitive
abilities across a 12-year period during middle adulthood.
The second strongest correlation emerged for changes in
fluid intelligence and changes in processing speed (r = .42),
indicating that those who showed a strong decline in fluid
intelligence also had the tendency to decline more than
average in processing speed. Finally, there was a moderate
correlation between the changes in memory and processing
speed (r = .32) and of the changes in memory and crys-
tallized intelligence (r = .23), indicating that changes in
memory and crystallized intelligence—albeit significantly
correlated—still differ substantially.
Discussion
In this study, we set out to shed some light on a secret,
namely, the question of whether cognition changes during
middle adulthood. As we have argued, there are at least five
different views of change within sample data, implying that
cognition can change in different ways. As a prerequisite of
examining the five types of change on the latent level, we
first established strong MI for the four cognitive abilities
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, memory, and
processing speed (cf. Meredith 1993). Note that such a
finding deserves mention on its own, because it implies that
the measurement properties of the ten cognitive tasks
remained largely constant across time. Only the residual
variances did change across time, implying that interindi-
vidual differences in manifest variables were not com-
pletely determined by the latent variables. Importantly,
Memory 
Processing 
Speed 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
Crystallized
Intelligence 
Fig. 1 Factor mean changes across 12 years, expressed as Cohen’s
d (N = 346)
Table 3 Factor and change factor correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Fluid intelligence at T1
2. Crystallized intelligence
at T1
.74
3. Memory at T1 .21 .29
4. Processing speed at T1 .66 42 .34
5. Change in fluid
intelligence
-.09 -.04 .11 -.01
6. Change in crystallized
int.
-.31 -.23 -.22 -.07 .73
7. Change in memory .01 -.05 -.36 .07 .20 .23
8. Change in processing
speed
-.02 .01 .17 .19 .42 .07 .32
Note: Correlations in italics are not statistically significant at p \ .05.
N = 346
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however, the fact that strong MI held allowed comparing
factor variances, factor covariances, and factor means—the
statistics describing the sample at T1 and T3 on the latent
level.
Next, structural stability was investigated. The increas-
ing covariance between memory and processing speed may
represent a spurious result, because the overall test did not
indicate any significant changes. Of course, statistical
power is an issue here. Although covariances among fac-
tors are much less contaminated by measurement errors,
they are estimated with less precision than covariances
among manifest indicators. Hence, the standard errors of
the former are larger than those of the latter. From this
perspective, the results regarding the covariance between
memory and processing speed are inconclusive. Still, we
did not find hints for substantial differentiation or dedif-
ferentiation processes in middle adulthood. Taking into
account that we covered a 12-year period in our analysis,
middle adulthood rather seems to be characterized by
substantial structural stability—as opposed to old age,
where at least in some studies dedifferentiation has been
reported (cf. Ghisletta and de Ribaupierre 2005; de Frias
et al. 2007).
Profound differential change only emerged for memory,
although the three other factors did also not show perfect
stability. As stability was modeled on the latent level, that
is, unaffected by measurement error, correlations less than
one do in some way mirror interindividual differences.
Although concentrating on general intelligence rather than
on specific cognitive abilities, the findings in our study
resemble the findings from Hertzog and Schaie (1986).
Memory performance not being stable may indicate that it
is more strongly affected by environmental influences such
as interindividually different demands at work or within the
social environment (cf. Martin and Zimprich 2005).
Only for processing speed an increasing variance
emerged, implying that development was heterogeneous
with respect to this factor. Although covering a longer
period of time, our findings are in line with the study from
Martin and Zimprich (2005), which relied on 4-year data
from ILSE. Change in processing speed therefore seems to
be characterized by increasing interindividual differences,
that is, individually differing change processes despite
strong differential stability.
Results indicate that, in our study, statistically signifi-
cant mean differences emerged for all cognitive variables,
ranging from medium to strong effect sizes. Fluid intelli-
gence, processing speed, and memory performance all
showed significant decline, whereas in crystallized intelli-
gence an increase emerged. This findings reflect the idea
that crystallized intelligence still increases in adulthood
while in more physiological cognitive functions such as
fluid intelligence, memory, and, especially, processing
speed decrease already sets in way earlier (cf. Cattell
1987).
A number of statistically significant change correlations
emerged. The strongest correlation emerged between
changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence. Note that this
correlation is not due to the fact that fluid and crystallized
intelligence shared a common manifest indicator. Individ-
uals decreasing only slightly in fluid intelligence exhibited
greater gain in crystallized intelligence. Again this finding
stands in line with Cattell’s (1987) theory regarding the
development of fluid and crystallized intelligence, because
fluid intelligence is considered to drive the acquisition of
knowledge and contributing to the amount of knowledge an
individual may gain across time. However, Cattell mainly
concentrated on childhood and early adulthood as he pos-
tulated that the investment of fluid intelligence into crys-
tallized extensively occurs during the schooling years. He
did not provide a substantial framework for cognitive
development in old age. Ackerman’s (1996) Intelligence-as-
process, personality, interests, and intelligence-as-knowl-
edge theory relates the development of cognitive abilities to
personality and interests. Here, it is suggested that, natu-
rally, cognitive abilities determine the probability of success
in a cognitive task, whereas personality and motivation
determine the amount of effort an individual puts into
attempting a special task. High cognitive abilities amplify
motivation because the probability of success in a cognitive
task increases. Success, in turn, functions as a reward and
may lead to increased interest and motivation. Hence, a
slight decrease in fluid intelligence affects the probability of
success in knowledge acquisition less than a strong decrease
and therefore does not constrain the motivation for knowl-
edge acquisition as much as a strong decrease. A further
possible explanation for this strong change correlation could
be that both reflect relatively broad ability dimensions,
drawing on the same cognitive resources.
Change in fluid intelligence also was correlated with
processing speed in the sense that individuals showing
greater decline in fluid intelligence also tended to decrease
more in processing speed (Zimprich and Martin 2002).
Assuming that both processes are more physiologically
based and relatively independent of environmental factors,
this correlation seems readily interpretable from a pro-
cessing resources point of view (Salthouse 1996). Small,
but statistically significant correlations emerged between
memory and processing speed as well as memory and
crystallized intelligence, respectively. Individuals showing
a greater decline in memory also experienced a decline in
processing speed, but a smaller increase in crystallized
intelligence. Two things are noteworthy in this regard.
First, the correlations among changes were weaker than
correlations among factors at T1, albeit the longitudinal
time span (12 years) is larger than the cross-sectional age
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range (5 years). One has to keep in mind, however, that the
cross-sectional age range of 5 years has to be seen against a
background of more than 40 years of development that has
already taken place. In other words, the cross-sectional
differences are also the result of 40 years of differential
development, which may explain why the interindividual
differences were more strongly correlated than interindi-
vidual differences in intraindividual change.
Second, compared to results from studies with older
adults, change correlations also appear to be weaker in
middle-aged adults (cf. Christensen et al. 2004; Hultsch
et al. 1998; Zimprich 2002; Zimprich and Martin 2009).
Note that, as Hofer and Sliwinksi (2001) have shown—all
other things being equal—in the long run the cross-sec-
tional correlation between two variables will approach the
correlation between the (linear) change in the two variables
(cf. Zimprich 2002). From this one would expect that
cross-sectional correlations between cognitive abilities
would decrease down to the change correlations, i.e., that
they differentiate slightly. The exception would be fluid
and crystallized intelligence, where the change correlation
was comparatively strong. However, in comparing cross-
sectional and change correlations, one should consider that
the signal-to-noise ratio is better in cross-sectional data
than in change data. In other words, change correlations are
expected to fluctuate much more than cross-sectional cor-
relations. In addition, during development into old age,
change processes may become more strongly intertwined
because of more pronounced changes in cognitive abilities.
Thus, change correlations among cognitive abilities could
be stronger in old age than in middle-aged adults.
Taken together, what do these results say about the
secret of cognitive change during middle adulthood? Mean
performance changes are very similar to those changes in
older adults, except maybe that crystallized intelligence
increased strongly in middle-aged adults while the decrease
in memory performance corresponded to a moderate effect
size only. However, the overall pattern of mean changes
nicely maps onto those of cognitive performance changes
in later years of life. A different picture emerged from the
other four types of change. Interindividual differences in
cognitive performance across 12 years appeared to be
remarkably stable. This is to say that from a between-
persons perspective focus on interindividual differences in
change, stability seems to outweigh change. Notwith-
standing, relatively seen it was memory performance and
processing speed that appeared to be especially vulnerable
to changes during middle adulthood, as was indicated by
the covariance between both tending to increase, the low
differential stability of memory and the significant variance
change in processing speed. Finally, the strongly correlated
change between fluid and crystallized intelligence has,
absent of structural change, differential change, and change
in divergence in these two abilities, also a stabilizing
effect, because it perpetuates interindividual differences.
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